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Capital Expenditure v. Business Expenditure

The tax treatment of company funds expended in the solicitation of business supply sources arose in the case of Van Iderstine
Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.' Petitioner company
rendered lard, tallow, and other by-products from fat and bones
which it collected from butcher shops, restaurants, hotels, slaughter
houses, and chain stores. Petitioner during the year 1950 paid
$25,000 to Food Fair Stores chain in consideration for agreements
giving petitioner the right for an indeterminate period to purchase all raw materials becoming available at their stores at the
current market price to be determined from time to time. The
agreements were subject to being discontinued at any time by
either party; no express promise existed on the part of either
party. Petitioner in filing its 1950 tax return treated the expenditure as a deductible business expense, but the Tax Court held
it to be a capital expenditure. 2 On appeal, the Tax Court decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Four alternative methods appear for accounting for the expenditure:
1) deducted as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense of the current tax year,
2) capitalized and amortized over the expected life of the
right,
3) capitalized and carried on the company books as an intangible asset until the agreement is terminated by either party,
then deducted as a capital loss,
4) capitalized and retained on the company books as an
intangible asset until the sale of the company, then treated as
a capital gain or loss.
The Commissioner contended that the expenditure was a
"capital expenditure" in that a contract right which extends past
the end of 1950 has been raised, but the Court of Appeals readily
disposed of the argument, stating that a contract must fail for
want of "mutuality of obligation."3 The Court then summarily
1
2
3

261 F.2d 211 (2nd Cir. 1958).
f1 57,177 P-H Tax Tc. Rep. & Mem. Dec. (1957).
1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152 (1950).
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dismissed the Commissioner's second contention that petitioner
purchased "goodwill" which also constitutes a capital expenditure, by stating that goodwill "always involves the relations of
the seller with third persons, relations that exist prior to purchasesale."
Although it is apparent that no contract existed between
the parties, it is submitted that a contract is not necessary in
order to constitute a capital expenditure; for example, the premium cost of obtaining a liquor license may be capitalized, even
though it is renewable each year, and there is no right to renewal,
but mere custom to renew.4 Although a contract of fixed duration
would form a basis for the amortization of the expenditure, such
amortization is not a necessary prerequisite for the expenditure
to be treated as a capital one, because an intangible asset may be
carried for the life of the company. Where an expenditure brings
about the acquisition of an asset having a period of useful life in
excess of one year, or if it secures to the taxpayer a like advantage
which has life of more than one year, it should be treated as a
capital outlay.5 Although it is recognized that Food Fair is not
bound by this agreement, it is also recognized that business is
conducted daily upon the word of the reputable businessman, so
that even though the agreement could not be enforced by petitioner
in a court of law, there still exists the moral obligation of Food
Fair, including their reputation, which may be considered an asset
to the petitioner's business. At the time of the action in the Tax
Court, seven years after the payment of the money to Food Fair,
the "right" of petitioner to collect scrap from Food Fair still existed.
Expenditures made to increase supply sources may be analogized to those made by publishing houses to increase their circulation. Expenses incurred in carrying on campaigns, drives, or
contests for the express purpose of increasing the circulation of
magazines have been held to constitute capital expenditures., The
court in the Meredith case distinguished between expenditures
made to increase circulation, which are capital, and those made

Morris Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951).
G United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742 (10th Cir. 1957).
6 Meredith Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1933).
26 U.S.C. § 23 (1939) was revised in 1954 to allow the cost of
4

increasing circulation to be deducted as a business expense at the

option of the taxpayer. Cost of building up and establishing a clientel
for a national advertising directory held to be a capital expenditure.
Reuben H. Donnelly Corp. v. Commissioner, 26 BTA 107 (1932).
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to maintain the present volume, which are ordinary and necessary,
and thus deductible business expenses of the year in which incurred.
It is submitted that the expenditures made by petitioner in the
instant case were for the express purpose of expanding its source
of supply, or "circulation", considering that the basis for payment
was $2,500 for each new store opened, and that payments were
not made in order to maintain any existing volume of supply.
Because of the nature of petitioner's business, there is a constant market for its product, so that no problem of goodwill arises
in the normal relationship of vendor-vendee. Peculiar, however,
to the business is the requirement for goodwill between the buyer
petitioner and his seller supplier; a constant source of raw materials is necessary for petitioner to remain in business. Expenditures to gain new customers and to maintain the goodwill of the
old constitute capital outlay.7 In order to insure the existence
of its business, and to facilitate expansion, it is as necessary for
petitioner to cultivate goodwill among its suppliers as it is for
another businessman to maintain goodwill with his customers.
How better can this relationship be acquired than by the payment
of money for the goodwill of one of the largest suppliers in the
area, an expanding food market chain.
It can be argued that there is possibly poor business taste in
calling the expenditure one for "goodwill", for it may appear to
constitute commercial bribery, in that the Court of Appeals stated
that goodwill of A cannot be obtained by paying money to A; it
will be noted that petitioner does not wish to call it goodwill. But
whether the expenditure is entitled "goodwill" or not, it appears
to the writer that it results in the acquisition of some intangible
asset which, in keeping with good accounting principles, s should
be carried on the balance sheet of petitioner and not deducted
during any one tax yearY
It is therefore submitted that the Court of Appeals has correctly answered the questions which it poses: 1) there is no
contract, and 2) the expenditure does not constitute goodwill, but
that the Court has asked the wrong questions. The query should
7 Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814 (4th Cir.
1937).
s HILLS LAW OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
102 (1957).

JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT, AND

ESTATE

TAXATION § 3.10 (7) (1954).
9 A distortion of yearly income results from a write-off in one year.
Commissioner v. Boylston Market Assn., 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942).
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rather be directed toward examining the nature, basis, and purpose
of the expenditure, and in view of the expansion characteristics
of the expenditure, and the acquired intangible "right" existing
past the end of the taxable year, it is submitted that the decision
of the Tax Court should have been affirmed.
Richard A. Huebner '60

